We analyze a well-known episode of a popular British TV game show, "Golden Balls," in which one of the two contestants lied about what he intended to do, which had the salutary effect of inducing both contestants to cooperate in what is normally a Prisoners' Dilemma (PD), wherein one or both contestants usually defected. This "solution" to PD assumes that the liar desired to be honorable in fulfilling his pledge to split the jackpot if he won but, surprisingly, he achieved this end without having to do so, astonishing the audience and receiving its acclaim. We note that this action has a biblical precedent in King Solomon's decision to cut a baby in two and, more generally, in resolving international conflicts, such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
Introduction
Beginning in June 2007 and running for more than two years, a popular British daytime game show called "Golden Balls" led to substantial frustration for many contestants, who were lied to and often betrayed by the other contestants. 1 This is not surprising, because in the final round of Golden Balls two contestants play a game called "Split or Steal," which, we argue, is a Prisoners' Dilemma.
What is surprising is that in one episode, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0qjK3TWZE8 one of the contestants announced in advance how he would play and then reneged on both his promises (in fact, we never learn whether he would have kept his second promise). Paradoxically, these lies led both players to cooperate in the original game.
In this note, we show that the player who made the announcement, whom we'll call A, complicated the game by pledging that he would choose a particular option in the original game and, if feasible, then make a later choice outside the original game. If the payoff to this player depends only on money and status-how did I do in comparison to my opponent?-we show in the next section that (i) the original game is a 2 ´ 2 Prisoners' Dilemma, in which cooperation is strongly dominated for both players; and (ii)
A's announcement induces a 3 ´ 2 game, in which cooperation is weakly dominated for one player and thus of no help in fostering cooperation. But if A's payoffs also depend on his honor in fulfilling his second promise, the game is transformed into another 3 ´ 2 1 Van den Assem, van Dolder, and Thaler (2012) analyzed 287 episodes, finding that in 69% either one (44%) or both (25%) players chose Steal, leaving only 31% in which there was no defection from Split so the jackpot was split. game, but one of incomplete information in which there was misperception by one player of the other player's preferences.
How did this happen if the players' strategies do not change in the second 3 ´ 2 game? First, A's announcement signaled that his goal might not be only to maximize his monetary payoff. Instead, it suggested that he might wish to honor his pledge about what he said he would do (split his winnings) after play of the original game.
But to get to this point, A had to prevent his adversary (B) from choosing noncooperation, which A did by credibly promising not to cooperate himself. Then A, correctly surmising that B would be forced to cooperate, could afford to act honorably and cooperate himself.
We begin our analysis by describing the rules of Golden Balls and then what usually happens in play of the game. 2 Although A's announcement in the aforementioned episode was only cheap talk, it had a salutary effect.
In fact, A's announcement and his failure to keep one of his promises was rational. It laid the groundwork for cooperation in a game of incomplete information, whereby B incorrectly perceived A's preferences which, fortunately for both players, redounded to their benefit.
Rules of Golden Balls
2 The TV show has attracted some scholarly attention, because in the experimental study of PD, it is thought to simulate "real life" situations more validly than laboratory settings. See, for example, Hart (2010) , van den Assem, van Dolder, and Thaler (2012) , Burton-Chellew and West (2012) , and Turmunkh, van den Assem, and van Dolder (2019) .
After a series of preliminary rounds, four contestants are reduced to two. We focus on this final stage of the game (called "Split or Steal"), which is governed by the following rules:
• Each contestant is given two balls. When opened, one indicates Split and the other Steal.
• Each contestant secretly opens his or her ball-to determine which is Split and which is Steal-and chooses one. Before making a choice, however, the contestants may speak to each other and also ask for advice from the host.
• If both choose Split, they each receive half the jackpot. We assume that the best outcome for A and the other contestant, B, is to win everything (payoff of 4), next best to win half (payoff of 3), next worst to win nothing when the opponent also wins nothing (payoff of 2), and worst to win nothing when the opponent wins everything (payoff of 1). We rank the last outcome worst because of the anger, humiliation, or shame a player would feel if he or she were betrayed into thinking an opponent would Split-but chose instead Steal-when he or she Split. 3
These payoffs indicate only an ordinal ranking of outcomes from best to worst.
As in Prisoners' Dilemma, the noncooperative strategy of Steal for each player strongly dominates the cooperative strategy of Split, rendering (2,2) the unique Nash-equilibrium outcome (starred in Game 1), at which both players obtain nothing.
In the actual play of Golden Balls on TV, each contestant usually tries to persuade his or her opponent to Split, promising to reciprocate so that both obtain half the jackpot.
But this strategy is not convincing, often leading one or both players to Steal and forgoing the cooperative (3,3) outcome.
A's Announcement
In the aforementioned episode of the game, which was between two men, A (2,2)* This game could also be written in extensive form (i.e., as a game tree), whereby
A makes a decision after learning the outcome of the 2 ´ 2 game. But the normal form (i.e., as a payoff matrix) makes it easier to compare with the earlier 2 ´ 2 game and the final game we discuss in the next section. Notice that, as in Game 1, each player does best when he wins the entire jackpot (4), next best (3) when there is a split, next worst (2) when both players Steal and there is nothing to split, and worst (1) when one wins the entire jackpot and the other nothing.
Observe that A has a weakly dominant strategy of "Steal, then don't Split (if possible)," whereas both of B's strategies are undominated. But given A's weakly dominant strategy, (2,2) in the lower right is the unique Nash-equilibrium outcome (starred) in Game 2, echoing the Nash-equilibrium outcome in the 2 ´ 2 game in which both players Steal and, consequently, walk away empty-handed.
These strategies, however, were not the choices of the players in the TV gamequite the opposite: both Split-suggesting that the payoffs in Game 2 are not an accurate reflection of the players' preferences. Instead, we believe, A had another goal in mind besides maximizing his winnings. 5
The Players' Preferences
We suggest that the effect of A's announcement was not only to increase A's strategies in Game 1 from two to three in Game 2. A also wanted to alter B's perception of the game first by appearing to be sincere in declaring his intention to Steal in the original game, then also saying that if B Split-so A would win the entire jackpot-A would honor his pledge to split the jackpot later.
But being honorable for A, we think, does not simply mean that he privately takes pride in "doing the right thing" by keeping his pledge to Split. He also wants to demonstrates publicly-in front of the studio audience as well as 2 million TV viewersthat he acted honorably. We postulate that A cared about the public perception of his honorability, which was immediately manifest in the astonished reactions of the host and the studio audience. Viewers at that time, and later on YouTube, generally applauded his daring choice (there have been some 10 million views of the video and 10 thousand comments on it). 5 Thereby we do not prescribe what the players should do but work backwards from their actual choices to infer what their goals must have been to act in the way that they did. In effect, we reconstruct a game in order to try to offer a coherent explanation, through "revealed preference," of why the players' choices are consistent with their actions (i.e., are rational). While this reasoning may appear tautologous, it is the foundation of all science, including mathematics, in which nonobvious theorems are derived from assumptions. Here the rational choices of A and B in a game provide an explanation of their behavior that, on first blush, seems inexplicable. It is worth noting that A's announcement has a precedent in the famous Bible story in which two women claimed maternity of a baby. When King Solomon announced that he would split the disputed baby in two if both women refused to give up their claims, he elicited from them responses that revealed who the true mother was, so there was no need to split the baby 7 -just as A's announcement in Golden Balls enabled both contestants to escape the dilemma in Prisoners' Dilemma and not leave empty-handed if they had both chosen Steal.
To be sure, Solomon's edict was not by one of the women but instead set the stage for one of the women (the mother) to speak up and offer the baby to the other woman. The other woman was somewhat akin to B, who was also deceived: She incorrectly thought that Solomon would stick to his edict and that she would win his favor. Little did she know that Solomon preferred a different outcome once he deduced who the true mother was, just as A preferred not to postpone his choice of Split but to do so in the game itself. 8
Other precedents include the naval blockade of Cuba by the United States during the October 1962 missile crisis with the Soviet Union. At the end of the crisis, which lasted 13 days, President Kennedy secretly pledged to eventually remove American missiles from Turkey, provided Premier Khrushchev immediately withdrew his missiles from Cuba. Khrushchev could not know for sure that Kennedy would honor his word, but a pledge by the American president was credible enough. The alternativemaintaining missies on the island-was bound to lead to a confrontation in which both sides would lose. 9
